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1 
Presidential Selection: Historical, Institutional, 
and Democratic Perspectives 
James A. Gardner* 
It has been nearly two centuries since an American presidential election has 
evoked a crisis of confidence like that following the election of 2016. Not since 
the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 has there been such a public display of 
anxiety concerning the methods by which we choose our chief executive. As in 
the contest of 1828 pitting the Democrat Jackson against his Federalist oppo-
nent John Quincy Adams, the presidential nominating process of 2016 pro-
duced a contest between a celebrity populist, widely seen as unqualified by 
experience or temperament, and a highly experienced and competent but 
deeply uninspiring political insider who had been anointed by establishment 
elites. 
This anxiety ran deep in 2016: for the first time in the quarter-century during 
which such statistics have been recorded, neither major party candidate was 
viewed favorably by even half the electorate.1 The emerging verdict appears to 
be that our system for selecting presidential candidates failed catastrophically 
in 2016, an impression many regard as confirmed by the damage subsequently 
inflicted on the office of the presidency and on our democratic institutions by 
the winner, Donald Trump. In offering a wide variety of suggestions about 
how to improve the nominating process, the contributors to this volume 
endorse the proposition that our presidential selection procedures now operate 
poorly and are in need of repair, if not wholesale rethinking. 
Meaningful criticism of the current process requires, however, that existing 
procedures be judged against some baseline of what constitutes a good candi-
date selection process, yielding good candidates who, one presumes, 
* James A. Gardner is Bridget and Thomas Black SUNY Distinguished Professor at the 
University at Buffalo Law School, State University of New York. He thanks Matt Steilen, 
Rick Su, Guyora Binder, and David McNamee for useful comments on a prior draft. 
1 William G. Mayer, Was the Process to Blame? Why Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump Won 
Their Parties’ Presidential Nominations, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 759 (2018). 
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subsequently go on to become good presidents. If the current system works 
poorly, in other words, how should a good system of presidential nomination 
work? What kind of candidates should it produce, and how ought it to be 
structured so as to produce them? What kinds of improvements are needed, 
and how, if at all, can we obtain them? To address these questions, this chapter 
draws on three potential sources of guidance—history, institutional analysis, 
and democratic theory—and yields four broad conclusions. 
First, an examination of the evolution of presidential nominating proce-
dures since the founding reveals a steady historical trend of convergence in the 
identities of two critically important groups: the selectorate—the group author-
ized to choose officially recognized nominees2 —and the electorate—the 
group that chooses the ultimate officeholder from among the nominees. 
Second, this convergence is significant because the design of nominating 
procedures has important consequences for the kinds of candidates likely to 
emerge as nominees. Third, although democratic theory can help a polity 
clarify the values it wishes its democratic institutions to promote, a turn to 
democratic theory does not relieve a polity of the antecedent need to make 
hard choices about its goals and commitments, which must come before it 
makes its hard choices about institutional design. Finally, although law is 
useful and important in structuring a presidential nominating process, citizen 
ethos—the collective internalization of consensual democratic norms—may 
well be the single most important factor necessary to the consistent production 
of high-quality presidential candidates. 
I. EXPANSION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTORATE 
A. The Founding Era (1788–1799) 
How to choose a president proved to be the most difficult issue the 
Philadelphia Convention addressed. After several false starts and lengthy 
debate, the Founders finally settled on a system that soon pleased no one— 
the Electoral College. Conceived as an intermediate body of wise and virtuous 
men who would stand between the people and the presidency, the members of 
the Electoral College were meant to exercise a kind of Burkean trusteeship in 
which they would base their selection of a president on “the information and 
discernment requisite to such complicated investigations”3 —that is, on their 
2 See, e.g., REUVEN Y. HAZAN & GIDEON RAHAT, DEMOCRACY WITHIN PARTIES: CANDIDATE  
SELECTION METHODS  AND  THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES  33–54 (2010). 
3 THE FEDERALIST, No. 68 (Hamilton). 
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own sound, informed, and independent judgment. In so doing, the Electoral 
College would protect the people against their own human weakness and 
potentially poor judgment by assuring that excessively ambitious men, skilled 
in “low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity,”4 would never attain the 
nation’s highest office. 
Interestingly, the Founders did not give much thought to the question of 
how qualified candidates for the presidency would come to the attention of the 
Electoral College. They did not provide for any system of nomination, nor did 
they grant the Electoral College any official authority to create one in the 
event that such a system should prove desirable. Instead, they seemed to 
assume that the nation’s leading candidates for the presidency would simply 
be known, either personally or by reputation,5 to the members of the Electoral 
College—a reasonable assumption, perhaps, in a world in which the ruling 
elite in any state might have numbered in the dozens, or at most, in the 
hundreds.6 
In this system, where nominations for the presidency were to be self-
generated by the same body authorized to elect the president, the selectorate 
was precisely co-extensive with the electorate. Such an arrangement, the 
Framers believed, would be most conducive to the election of presidents 
with the desired characteristics, namely, “preeminen[ce] for ability and 
virtue.”7 Certainly, the Founders would never have contemplated assigning 
the nominating function to political parties, an institution they considered 
detestably self-interested and factional, and indeed hoped would never appear 
on the American political landscape.8 
B. The First Party System (1800–1824) 
In less than two decades, of course, parties did appear on the scene, and they 
were quickly integrated into the presidential selection process. Parties of the 
Jeffersonian era were not like their modern counterparts; they did not conceive 
of themselves as representing a subset of the populace whose goal was to offer 
4 Id. 
5 JAMES  W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY  AND  DEVELOPMENT 66, 83 (1979). 
6 For example, due to property qualifications, the number of people eligible to serve as governor 
of South Carolina under its 1778 constitution was probably twenty-five or fewer. 
James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of 
State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1273 n.275 
(1998). 
7 THE  FEDERALIST, No. 68 (Hamilton). 
8 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE  IDEA OF A  PARTY  SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE 
OPPOSITION IN THE  UNITED STATES, 1780–1840, at  9 (1970). 
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to the electorate a political vision or set of programmatic alternatives in a fair 
and equal competition for voter approval. Instead, parties of this era conceived 
of themselves as parties “of the whole people, not of any part or of any 
minority.”9 The Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans, in particular, thought 
of themselves as embodying the original, animating spirit of the revolutionary 
nation, a spirit that they believed required restoration following what they 
viewed as the subversion of the established constitutional order by the 
Federalists during the administration of John Adams. Self-organization into 
parties, for the Jeffersonians, was an unpleasant but temporary expedient that 
could be abandoned following successful restoration of the true revolutionary 
order.10 
To accomplish this task, the Jeffersonians deliberately exploited weaknesses 
in the design of the Electoral College to transform it into a vehicle of partisan 
mobilization. Their plan had two parts. First, they pre-selected their presiden-
tial candidate on partisan grounds, and through ground-level political activity 
promoted as candidates for the Electoral College individuals already com-
mitted to the party’s candidate, an action that transformed members of the 
Electoral College into “instructed agents, not deliberative trustees.”11 Second, 
they de facto replaced the Electoral College as the instrument of candidate 
nomination with a newly devised, shadow organization, the congressional 
caucus. These caucuses consisted of informal meetings of members of 
Congress who shared party membership; at these caucuses, participants 
reached consensus on the identity of the party’s candidate for the 
presidency.12 The caucus choice went on to win the presidency in every 
election from 1800 to 1816. 13 
As a functional matter, the caucus system thus substituted the congres-
sional caucus for the Electoral College as the nominating selectorate. As 
a result of this change,  “[t]he ideological orthodoxy of the candidates . . .  
became a decisive criterion for selection, while competence, virtue, and 
9 ALFRED DE GRAZIA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC 114 (reprint ed. 1985) (orig. ed. 1951). 
10 CEASER. supra note 5, at  91; GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION  OF  PARTY POLITICS 22–25 
(2002). 
11 CEASER, supra note 5, at  88. 
12 Emmett H. Buell, Jr., Presidential Nominations of the Pre-Convention Era, in ENDURING 
CONTROVERSIES IN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS 35–38 (Emmett H. Buell, Jr. & 
William G. Mayer eds., 2004); William G. Morgan, The Origin and Development of the 
Congressional Caucus, in ENDURING CONTROVERSIES, supra, at  60. 
13 Stephen Gardbaum & Richard H. Pildes, Populism and Institutional Design: Methods of 
Selecting Candidates for Chief Executive, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 653 (2018). 
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service to the state—the Founders’ intended criteria—receded into the 
background.”14 
C. The Second Party System (1828–1912) 
The emergence of the Democratic party and the successful election of its 1828 
candidate for president, Andrew Jackson, permanently and dramatically chan-
ged the American system of presidential selection in two important ways. First, 
under the ideological leadership of Martin Van Buren, Jacksonian Democrats 
developed for the first time a justification for a system of permanent party 
competition. Such a system, they contended, would institutionalize popular 
sovereignty by ensuring, first, that the people would always have a ready 
alternative to the government in power; and second, that they could hold 
incumbents accountable by voting them out and voting into power the 
opposition party. Second, Jacksonian Democrats advanced a very different 
conception of the presidency: the president, they claimed, was the only official 
in the United States who represented, and was accountable to, the entirety of 
the populace. To ensure presidential responsiveness to the appropriate con-
stituency, the process of selecting presidential candidates had to be committed 
to a “mass” party of nationwide scale15 whose members possessed a strong voice 
in the nominating process. 
Jacksonian Democrats made good on these commitments by transferring 
the power to nominate from the congressional caucus to a national party 
convention.16 In this system, each party nominated its candidate at 
a national convention whose members were party delegates chosen principally 
by state and local party organizations to represent their membership. During 
the nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth, the actual selection of 
convention delegates was typically made directly by state and local party 
leaders, who consequently exercised a great deal of control over the course 
of the convention and the ultimate nomination.17 The selectorate, in this 
system, thus comprised convention delegates hand-picked by local party 
bosses. 
14 CEASER, supra note 5, at  96. 
15 JOHN  ALDRICH, WHY  PARTIES?: THE  ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
IN AMERICA 97–98 (1995). 
16 Emmett H. Buell, Jr., The National Nominating Convention, in ENDURING CONTROVERSIES, 
supra note 12, at  79. 
17 Gardbaum & Pildes, supra note 13, at  654. 
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D. The Progressive Era (1912–1972) 
The Progressive movement arose in the 1880s, reaching the height of its 
influence in the early twentieth century. In their political views, Progressives 
echoed the founding-era distaste for political parties, but on different grounds: 
they viewed parties as captives of local machine bosses and corrupted by 
corporate interests for the benefit of the wealthy. As a result, on the 
Progressive view, parties had collaborated in bending government policies 
away from their true purpose—service to the common good—and toward 
a clientelistic system of local plunder of public assets. At the same time, 
Progressives saw the presidency as requiring enormous power in the modern 
world, and indeed as the one organ of government most capable of operating 
effectively in a dangerous world that often required swift and energetic 
national action, and in a manner genuinely responsive to mass public opinion. 
Progressives implemented these views by leading a successful movement to 
require parties to nominate candidates through the use of direct primary 
elections. First introduced in 1899, when the Minnesota legislature enacted 
direct primaries for Minneapolis local elections,18 the use of primary elections 
spread quickly: by 1916 over half the states utilized some form of primary, and 
by 1958 primary elections were nearly universally available,19 though not 
always mandatory. 
The movement toward primary elections continued a trend of expanding 
the nominating selectorate. From the members of the Electoral College, to 
the members of a congressional caucus, to delegates to a nationwide party 
convention, the presidential selectorate now increasingly included the rank 
and file membership of national political parties. 
E. Consolidation of the Mass Selectorate: The 1970s Reforms and Beyond 
By the mid-twentieth century, although most states offered the option of 
nomination by direct primary, parties were not necessarily required to select 
convention delegates according to the results of primary elections. Instead, the 
route to a party’s presidential nomination typically lay through a mixed system 
in which candidates still had to seek privately the personal support of party 
18 ROBERT G. BOATWRIGHT, CONGRESSIONAL PRIMARY ELECTIONS 27 (2014). There is some 
disagreement about where and when the first primary was introduced. Masket, for example, 
places it in Wisconsin in 1904. SETH MASKET, THE  INEVITABLE PARTY: WHY ATTEMPTS  TO  
KILL THE PARTY SYSTEM FAIL AND HOW  THEY WEAKEN DEMOCRACY 127 (2016). 
19 BOATWRIGHT, supra note 18, at  27. 
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leaders, but could sometimes help their case by demonstrating their ability to 
win votes in advisory primary elections.20 
This system was replaced, almost at a stroke, following the divisive 1968 
Democratic convention in Chicago. There, while anti-Vietnam War protests 
were violently suppressed by the local political boss, Chicago Mayor Richard 
Daley, the convention proceeded to nominate the establishment, pro-war 
candidate, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, passing over a highly popular, 
anti-war candidate, Senator Eugene McCarthy. In response to the subsequent 
outcry from many quarters within the party—and the party’s crushing defeat at 
the hands of Richard Nixon—the Democratic Party created the McGovern-
Fraser Commission to recommend changes to the party’s presidential selec-
tion procedure for the 1972 election. The Commission’s principal charge was 
to recommend ways to improve representation at the convention of previously 
excluded groups, including women, minorities, and young people.21 
The Commission responded with recommendations to open up the process 
by decreasing the proportion of convention delegates chosen directly by party 
leaders, requiring transparency in the selection of delegates, and imposing 
quotas that would increase the diversity of convention delegations. The Party 
adopted these recommendations, leaving the mode of compliance to state 
party organizations. In an unforeseen development, state parties—joined in 
many cases by state legislatures through the exercise of their Article II power to 
direct the manner of appointment of presidential electors—complied by 
moving to an almost entirely plebiscitary system of delegate selection through 
direct primary elections.22 The Republican Party soon followed suit, in many 
cases under compulsion of state legislation. The changes were dramatic; as 
Gardbaum and Pildes explain, “[i]In 1968, the primaries had bound 36%of the  
delegates to each convention; just four years later, the primaries bound 58% of  
the Democratic delegates and 41% of the Republican ones, and by 1976, two-
thirds of the Democrat delegates and more than half the Republican ones were 
bound.”23 Thus, by the late-twentieth century, the presidential selectorate had 
come to comprise essentially the entirety of the national parties’ rank and file 
membership.24 
20 Gardbaum & Pildes, supra note 13, at  655–56. 
21 CEASER, supra note 5, at  277–84. 
22 Gardbaum & Pildes, supra note 13, at  659. 
23 Id. 
24 Political scientists disagree over the extent to which the move to direct primaries gave control 
over nominations to the party rank and file. According to one view, party elites continue to 
exercise a great degree of de facto control over the identity of nominees. See, e.g., Hans 
J. G. Hassell, Party Control of Party Primaries: Party Influence in Nominations for the U.S. 
Senate, 78 J. POL. 75 (2015). Others, however, argue that the inclusiveness of nominating 
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Even this, however, did not represent the conclusion of the trend of expan-
sion of the selectorate. In subsequent decades, some states began to experi-
ment with opening up their primary elections beyond party rank and file. In 
a “semi-closed” primary, used by some parties for at least some offices in more 
than a dozen states, independent voters—those who have chosen not to 
affiliate formally with any party—may nevertheless vote in primary elections. 
In such a primary, the selectorate thus consists of the party rank and file plus 
any independent voters who choose to participate. In an “open” primary, used 
by some parties for some offices in more than twenty states, voters may vote in 
any party’s primary, even if they have registered as members of a different 
party. In these primaries, the selectorate is expanded to include not only the 
party’s rank and file, but also members of opposing parties. And in a “non-
partisan” primary, used in California, Washington, and Louisiana, all voters, 
regardless of prior registration, may vote for any candidate of any party. The 
two candidates with the most votes then run against each other in the general 
election, regardless of their partisan affiliation. In this kind of primary, the 
selectorate consists in principle of the entire electorate.25 
Moreover, in response to dissatisfaction within the Democratic party over 
the 2016 nomination process, especially from supporters of Senator Bernie 
Sanders, the chief competitor to Hillary Clinton, the national Democratic 
Party recently announced it will consider further empowering the rank and file 
by reducing the role of “superdelegates” at the national convention. These 
processes has contributed to the creation of a candidate-centered politics in which alliances of 
candidates and their supporters effectively control the nominating process. See, e.g., HAZAN & 
RAHAT, supra note 2, at  148, 151. Some go even further, and argue that the polarity of party 
influence has reversed itself: instead of parties dictating the commitments of their nominees, it 
is candidates who now set the agenda to which their parties must then conform. See, e.g., 
Richard S. Katz, The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party Democracy, 7 PARTY 
POL. 277, 278 (2001); Austin Ranney, Candidate Selection, in DEMOCRACY AT THE POLLS: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COMPETITIVE NATIONAL ELECTIONS 103 (David Butler et al. eds. 
1981); Gerald C. Wright, Rules and the Ideological Character of Primary Electorates, in 
REFORMING THE PRESIDENTIAL  NOMINATION PROCESS 24 (Steven S. Smith & Melanie 
J. Springer eds., 2009). 
25 Another kind of primary, the so-called “blanket” primary, was invalidated by the Supreme 
Court in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000). In a blanket primary, every 
voter may vote in the primary election for any candidate of any party. The candidate of each 
party with the most votes is declared that party’s nominee for purposes of the general election. 
The difference between a blanket and non-partisan primary is that in a blanket primary, each 
party is forced to include in its selectorate all other voters, a feature that the Court viewed as an 
unconstitutional interference with the right of party members to choose with whom to 
associate. In a non-partisan primary, in contrast, parties are stripped of the right to nominate 
candidates onto the general election ballot, so no party, in the Court’s view, is forced to 
associate with anyone against its will in choosing a nominee. 
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delegates, who comprised about 15 percent of convention delegates in 2016, 
consist of party leaders and insiders whose presence at the convention had 
been thought to provide some ballast in the form of expertise and political 
experience. 
In the march from semi-closed, to open, to non-partisan primary elections, 
the selectorate progressively becomes broader and broader to the point that it 
begins to converge with the electorate. History is thus in a sense circling back 
upon itself. During the founding era, the electorate and selectorate coincided, 
but both were extremely narrow in scope; in today’s system, the electorate and 
selectorate also coincide, or nearly so, but both are broad-based, with the 
selectorate seemingly on a path soon to converge fully with the electorate. In 
the founding era version, nomination and election were the province of elites 
and party insiders, and non-elites and rank-and-file party members were 
excluded. Under today’s system, nomination and election are the almost 
exclusive province of the mass electorate, and it is experienced, senior mem-
bers of the party who lack a formal voice in the nominating process—a 
development that has been called, tellingly, the decline of “peer review.”26 
II. INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS: THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF NOMINATING PROCEDURES 
The United States is today a polity of more than 300 million, spread over 
thousands of miles of territory and, for purposes of presidential election, 
divided by law into 51 separate political communities. Because such an entity 
is incapable of spontaneously generating plausible candidates for national 
political office, some procedure for nominating candidates is therefore 
required. By nominating procedure, I mean simply mechanisms, established 
by law or by rules adopted by an officially recognized nominating entity, such 
as a political party, that distinguish candidates authorized to stand for office 
from those who are not. Moreover, because we want our presidents to be good 
ones, any procedure for generating presidential candidates should select them 
for the qualities we most wish our presidents to possess. The issue to which 
I now turn is the effect of nominating procedures on the characteristics 
possessed by candidates who successfully clear the hurdle of obtaining 
a nomination. 
Variations in nominating procedures can in principle exert a triple screen-
ing effect on candidate characteristics. First, simply by establishing procedural 
26 The term dates at least to the 1980s. See Elaine C. Kamarck, Returning Peer Review to the 
American Presidential Nomination Process, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 709 (2018). 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University at Buffalo Libraries, on 02 Aug 2021 at 14:36:30, subject to the Cambridge Core 
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108883870.002 
Perspectives on Presidential Selection 19 
requirements to obtain nomination, they can influence at the outset who 
might be tempted even to attempt a presidential run. Second, by manipulating 
the identity of the selectorate, nominating procedures tend to prescreen for the 
kinds of individuals who are most capable of making a successful appeal to the 
body doing the nominating. Third, by establishing the criteria that define 
the selectorate, and that distinguish one selectorate from another, nominating 
procedures can influence the substantive grounds along which the eventual 
candidates differentiate themselves. 
A. Self-Screening Effects 
Perhaps the most immediate impact of nominating procedures is their power 
to induce self-screening among potential candidates. The mere establishment 
of any set of nominating procedures will tend to attract candidates who are—or 
at least who think they are—more likely to succeed under the established 
procedures, and to deter those who are less likely to prosper under whatever 
procedures happen to prevail. For example, something as basic as a long 
primary season will tend to attract candidates who possess the physical robust-
ness and mental and emotional stamina to traverse the entire process—char-
acteristics in our day often spoken of, sometimes approvingly and sometimes 
not, as “fire in the belly.” Potential candidates, even those well-qualified for 
the presidency on other grounds, are conversely likely to be deterred from 
attempting to run in a process that they suspect they will be either unlikely or 
unwilling to complete. Similarly, a nominating procedure that is expensive 
will tend to deter candidates who either do not possess or are unwilling to 
invest, substantial personal resources; or who are not well-positioned, either for 
lack of connections, pre-nomination public support, or native fund-raising 
ability, to raise the money necessary to make a presidential run. 
B. The Nature of Appeals to the Selectorate 
Selectorates may be defined in many different ways, for many different 
reasons, but one inevitable effect of defining a selectorate is to establish the 
characteristics of the group to which potential presidential candidates must 
appeal in order to secure nomination.27 As a result, nominating procedures 
will tend to screen in candidates who possess personal characteristics that 
allow them to appeal successfully to the relevant selectorate, and to screen out 
those who lack the characteristics or ability to make such appeals. 
27 See CEASER, supra note 5, at  18, 233; see also id. at  55, 62, 119. 
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This can have potentially significant consequences for the qualities pos-
sessed by candidates, because different qualities may be necessary to appeal 
successfully to different selectorates, depending on their composition. For 
example, if the selectorate is a congressional caucus, then the successful 
candidate must be able to appeal to sitting members of Congress, an elite 
group that is unusually well-informed about the qualities necessary for pre-
sidential success. Different characteristics and abilities, on the other hand, 
may be necessary to appeal successfully to a selectorate consisting of the entire 
party membership, the party activist base, local party bosses, rich donors, or 
other groups. Indeed, a common complaint about the current process of party 
nominations is that different qualities are necessary to appeal successfully to 
the party rank and file when seeking the nomination than are required to 
appeal to the electorate as a whole when running for the actual office.28 
C. Substantive Grounds of Nomination and Election 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, nominating procedures establish the 
cleavages along which the choice of nominees will be made, thus influencing 
the issues that will be salient not only in the eventual choice of nominees, but in 
the general election. The mechanism—unintended but inevitable—works like 
this. The establishment of nominating procedures includes defining the selecto-
rate. If the system divides the polity into multiple selectorates, each of which is 
authorized to put forward nominees—if, that is, the bodies that do the nominat-
ing comprise some subset of the body that does the electing—then some criterion 
will necessarily define the various selectorates, distinguishing them from one 
another. The criteria that distinguish one selectorate from another in turn will 
then influence (though they need not fully determine) the criteria by which 
competing selectorates choose their nominees. And this in turn will influence the 
qualities that distinguish the nominees from one another in the general election, 
thereby influencing the grounds on which they are chosen by the electorate. 
This phenomenon may be easiest to see by analogy to a more familiar one: 
dividing the electorate into legislative districts.29 Tip O’Neill, Speaker of the 
28 Richard Nixon reportedly offered the following advice to Bob Dole, the 1996 Republican 
candidate for President: “you have to run as far as you can to the right [during the primaries] 
because that’s where 40% of the people who decide the nomination are. And to get elected you 
have to run as fast as you can back to the middle, because only about 4% of the nation’s voters 
are on the extreme right wing.” Jack Nelson, Letters from Nixon Shape Dole’s Campaign 
Strategy, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1995. 
29 Here I draw on an argument made in James A. Gardner, How to Do Things with Boundaries: 
Redistricting and the Construction of Politics, 11 ELECTION L.J. 399 (2012). 
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U.S. House of Representatives from 1977 to 1987, famously quipped that “all 
politics is local.”30 O’Neill was accurate, but as political theorist Andrew 
Rehfeld subsequently observed, all politics is local only because we draw 
legislative districts territorially. If we drew districts based on occupation, 
Rehfeld argued, then “all politics would be ‘vocational.’”31 The important 
point is that in a contestatory political system, the contest often, even usually, 
will be won or lost along the cleavages that define the sorting of voters,32 and 
the identity of those issue cleavages can be managed—or manipulated—in the 
process of drawing the districts. 
The same holds for the process by which we divide the nationwide 
presidential electorate into competing selectorates, which might usefully 
be conceived as a kind of electoral “districting.” If, for example, we defined 
selectorates by gender, with men entitled to nominate one candidate and 
women another, issues related to gender would be much more likely than 
under the present system regularly to rise to prominence in the nomina-
tion process. If selectorates were designated by race, ethnicity, or language, 
then those issues would likely be highly salient in the nominating and 
electoral phases. If the selectorates corresponded to income groupings— 
say, for example, the rich got to nominate one candidate, the middle class 
another, and so on—then issues of economic class would likely predomi-
nate in the selection of nominees. The point, again, is that the criteria 
used to define the selectorates will influence the cleavages that divide the 
candidates at the nomination phase, and thus the nature of the issues that 
confront the electorate in the general election. Thus, how we nominate 
influences not just the personal characteristics of the candidates, but the 
grounds on which they are likely to compete first for nomination, and then 
for election. 
As it happens, we have for more than two hundred years assigned the job of 
producing nominations to national political parties, organizations that generally 
tend to distinguish themselves—at least in theory—along a spectrum of political 
ideology. By defining the selectorate in ideological terms, our system thus tends 
to produce—and, one presumes, is intended to produce—nominees who are 
distinguished from one another mainly on the basis of their ideological and 
programmatic commitments, thus presenting the electorate with a choice lying 
30 THOMAS P. O’NEILL, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL AND OTHER RULES OF THE GAME  (1993). 
31 ANDREW REHFELD, THE  CONCEPT  OF  CONSTITUENCY: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 8 (2005). 
32 Thomas W. Pogge, Self-Constituting Constituencies to Enhance Freedom, Equality, and 
Participation in Democratic Procedures, 49 THEORIA 26, 49 (2002); LANI GUINIER, THE 
TYRANNY  OF  THE  MAJORITY 101 (1994). 
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along that axis. Although from many perspectives it may be desirable to design 
a system that tends to force voters into choosing among candidates on ideologi-
cal grounds, ideology is not the only criterion salient to presidential success. 
Section D below takes up the question of whether it is possible to define 
selectorates so as to generate candidates who distinguish themselves along 
other salient dimensions. 
D. Congruence of Selectorate and Electorate 
As discussed earlier, a strong historical trend in the evolution of presidential 
nominating procedures has produced a growing convergence between pre-
sidential selectorates and the presidential electorate, with the former slowly 
expanding toward the boundaries of the latter. In light of the analysis set out 
above, what is the likely effect of such convergence on the grounds upon 
which selectorates nominate and electorates subsequently elect? 
When the selectorate and the electorate are congruent, the potential ben-
efits of deliberate institutional design are nullified: the system fails to nudge 
the choice of candidates into any particular orientation, so the choice of 
nominees is no longer channeled along any particular set of criteria or along 
any cleavage upon which the electorate might reasonably be thought—or 
hoped—to divide. As a result, nominations can much more easily be made 
upon any ground, whether or not relevant to the qualities presidential nomi-
nees ought to possess. Control over the criteria of nomination—that is to say, 
the advantage associated with the power to set the agenda—is thus abandoned 
by the polity and in a sense delegated to the discretion of individual actors 
within the system. 
Consider, for example, a small committee or board the rules of which 
permit nominations for officers to be made by any member, without restric-
tion. In those circumstances, the grounds for nomination will be determined 
entirely by the discretion of individual members. Board members might 
nominate on the basis of competence or experience, but they might just as 
easily nominate on the basis of family ties, personal friendship, hope of 
personal gain, race, gender, or religion. Any constraints on the grounds of 
nomination, if they exist at all, will be supplied by informal norms of the 
group, and the constraining effect of those norms will depend entirely on the 
willingness of members to observe them.33 
33 Hazan and Rahat argue that the inclusiveness of American parties’ procedures for selecting 
legislative candidates is responsible for reducing party discipline within legislatures. Reuven 
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It is worth recalling here that the Framers designed the Electoral College, in 
which the selectorate and electorate coincided, for the express purpose of 
impeding nomination on the basis of partisan ideology. Such a system, they 
hoped, would promote selection on the basis of national reputation, 
a reputation they felt could be earned only by individuals of great virtue and 
ability and little personal ambition, on the model of a Patriot King, 
Cincinnatus, or George Washington.34 But that reputation, they clearly 
believed, would be based on personal, non-partisan, non-ideological charac-
teristics of the candidates. The Electoral College might have worked that way 
had the informal norms of the group remained stable. Those norms, however, 
changed radically when the Jeffersonians captured the process for electing 
members of the Electoral College and converted it into a system highly 
responsive to partisan considerations. 
Moreover, even if the Framers were correct that congruence between the 
selectorate and electorate is likely to produce nominees with national reputa-
tions, the modern selectorate is very different from the Founding-era Electoral 
College, and changes in technology and political and social norms have 
drastically altered what it means to have a “national reputation,” as well as 
the grounds upon which such a reputation can be made and the kinds of 
people who are capable of developing such a reputation. “Celebrity,” in all its 
modern forms, simply did not exist in that era. In any case, both history and 
institutional logic demonstrate that congruence of the selectorate and the 
electorate creates institutional conditions in which the grounds of nomination 
are neither pressured by design incentives to lie along any particular axis of 
choice nor easily controlled by post-design regulatory measures. 
E. The Need for Intentional Design 
The foregoing historical and institutional analyses demonstrate, if nothing 
else, that a presidential nominating system might be built in many ways, and 
that details of design can exert some degree of influence—perhaps 
a considerable influence—on the criteria by which nominations are made, 
the qualities and characteristics of the nominees and ultimate officeholders, 
and even the grounds upon which the presidency is contested. There is thus 
no “natural” or even “best” way to structure a presidential nominating 
Y. Hazan & Gideon Rahat, Candidate Selection: Methods and Consequences, in HANDBOOK 
OF  PARTY POLITICS 116–17 (Richard S. Katz & William Crotty eds., 2006). 
34 See Henry St. John Bolingbroke, The Idea of a Patriot King (1738); RALPH KETCHUM, 
PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTY: THE  FIRST AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 1789–1829, at  89 (1984). 
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procedure. On the contrary, the way such a system operates is highly con-
tingent on its design, and it is therefore essential that a polity designing such 
a system for itself makes a clear and deliberate choice about the qualities it 
wants its candidates to possess, and then to build a nominating system adapted 
as well as possible to generating nominations of persons with those qualities. 
But if,  at  the end  of  the day, we must make these  kinds of hard choices,  
how should we do so? On what basis? Because nomination is an element of 
what has become a largely democratic process, one place to turn for assis-
tance in making, or at least narrowing, the field of choices is democratic 
theory. 
III. DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRESIDENTIAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Over time, as we have seen, the process of presidential selection has become 
increasingly democratic, even plebiscitary. Since the founding, popular parti-
cipation has increased dramatically during both the nomination phase, follow-
ing the turn to direct primary elections, and during the election phase, 
following the conversion of the Electoral College into an institution that 
passes through, as far as its structure will allow, nationwide popular sentiment 
as expressed at the polls. To the extent that the process of presidential selection 
is democratic, then, democratic theory might offer some guidance about how 
best to structure it. 
The guidance it offers, however, is limited. First, there are many compet-
ing theories of democracy, and each theory emphasizes different values and 
aspects of democratic practice. Consequently, democratic theory cannot 
definitively settle questions about democratic structure and practice, 
although it can help clarify the values among which polities must choose 
when designing democratic institutions. Second, most theories of democ-
racy now in circulation do not readily generate concrete prescriptions for 
operationalizing their own commitments, so it is difficult to take guidance 
from them in designing appropriate implementing institutions. Third, even 
when democratic theories generate adequately specific prescriptions, those 
prescriptions often suffer from serious problems of infeasibility in actual 
implementation. 
A. Varieties of Democratic Theory 
“Democratic theory” is far from monolithic: many theories of democracy 
currently circulate. Below are a few of the most common. 
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 PROTECTIVE DEMOCRACY. From the time of the founding, one of the 
most common justifications for democratic forms of government is a set of 
theories that can be captured under the broad heading of “protective 
democracy.”35 Although the details sometimes vary, theories of protective 
democracy usually center on two core beliefs: that the ultimate purpose of 
government is to protect the rights and liberties of the citizenry; and that 
democracy is a form of government particularly well suited to accomplish 
that goal. 
 DEVELOPMENTAL DEMOCRACY. Generally associated with thinkers such 
as Mill36 and, later, with participationists such as Pateman and Barber,37 
theories of developmental democracy hold that the most important 
function of democracy is its capacity, by creating opportunities for 
popular participation in self-governance, to foster and maintain in the 
populace the skills of citizenship. These skills are critical because, as 
Mill wrote, “human beings are only secure from evil at the hands of 
others, in proportion as they have the power of being, and are, self-
protecting; and they only achieve a high degree of success in [that] 
struggle . . ., in proportion as they are self-dependent, relying on what 
they themselves can do, . . .  rather than on what others can do for 
them.”38 
 DEMOCRATIC MINIMALISM. Pioneered by the mid-twentieth-century 
political theorist Joseph Schumpeter, democratic minimalism holds 
that “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving 
at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”39 On this view, the 
polity is fundamentally a passive observer of the political activities of 
elites, and its capacity to influence public affairs is limited to replacing 
one set of rulers with another. 
 AGGREGATIVE THEORIES. More sophisticated versions of minimalism, 
aggregative or economic theories of democracy rest on the utilitarian 
premise that the good of society is achieved through the maximization 
of collective welfare. Democracy, in such theories, performs this function 
when parties and candidates offer competing programmatic commit-
ments and voters then choose among the options by voting for the 
35 DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1987). 
36 JOHN  STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT  (1861). 
37 CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY  (1970); BENJAMIN BARBER, 
STRONG  DEMOCRACY (1984). 
38 MILL, supra note 36, ch. III. 
39 JOSEPH  SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 260 (1942). 
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candidate whose policy commitments will provide them with the greatest 
benefits.40 Through the operation of forces similar to those prevailing in 
well-functioning markets, social utility is said to be maximized through 
the mechanical aggregation of the uncoordinated, self-interested deci-
sions of voters. 
 DELIBERATIVE THEORIES. The most recent entry into the field, delibera-
tive theories of democracy reject the minimalist and aggregative premises 
that citizens have limited capacity to participate meaningfully in politics; 
and reject the contention that politics consists of the mere summing of 
individual utility preferences. Harkening back to earlier, thicker concep-
tions of democracy, deliberativists contend that citizens’ preferences, and 
even their political self-understandings and identities, are formed in 
reasoned, self-conscious, and deliberative processes of political engage-
ment; and that only viewpoints formed in this fashion are entitled to full 
consideration in the process by which a democratic society decides how 
best to govern itself.41 
* * *  
Each of these theories of democracy emphasizes different democratic values 
and aspects of democratic practice, and each thus offers distinct guidance as to 
the qualities that presidents and presidential candidates ought to possess. For 
example, under a theory of protective democracy, the most important quality 
a presidential candidate must possess would seem to be a substantive commit-
ment to individual liberty. Aggregative theories, in contrast, seem to demand 
presidential candidates capable of balancing and adjusting competing voter 
preferences—a kind of talent for brokering.42 Under deliberative theories, in 
contrast, the ideal presidential candidate would presumably be a skilled delib-
erator capable of leading the citizenry through a process of meaningful 
deliberation, who would respect, and exercise self-restraint in the face of, the 
outcomes of meaningful public deliberation. 
For this reason, a turn to democratic theory cannot settle disputes over the 
qualities that presidential candidates ought to possess. It can, however, clarify 
the available choices and their consequences, and might therefore usefully 
assist a polity in recognizing those aspects of democracy that it most values and 
40 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY  OF  DEMOCRACY (1957). 
41 See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE  GOOD POLITY: 
NORMATIVE  ANALYSIS OF THE STATE (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds. 1989); 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY  OF  LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
42 See CEASER, supra note 5, at  158. 
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wishes to advance in its democratic institutions and practices. This may not be 
an easy task. First, no general consensus exists as to the descriptive accuracy, 
normative attractiveness, or pragmatic feasibility of any of these theories, so 
there is no default preference that might be invoked in the face of disagree-
ment. Second, the process of choosing among democratic theories is compli-
cated by the fact that the various theories have acquired over time a distinct 
ideological valence, even a partisan one: present-day conservatives and liber-
tarians tend to gravitate toward protective and aggregative theories of democ-
racy, while liberals tend to prefer developmental and deliberative conceptions. 
Thus, any enterprise of attempting to choose, in a sober, constitutional mode, 
among foundational democratic theories runs the risk of activating the habi-
tual partisan cleavages of ordinary politics. 
The need for affirmative choice is all the more urgent, however, because not 
all of these characteristics are equally likely to reside in the same individual. 
Aggregative brokering, for example, is in a sense the precise opposite of 
deliberative consensus-building. Brokering among competing interests 
requires facilitating logrolling and compromise, a task undertaken most effec-
tively by according unquestioned validity to the merits of participants’ 
demands and underlying beliefs. Deliberative consensus-building, on the 
other hand, requires leading participants through a process of potentially 
transformative self-reflection and self-interrogation as a means to achieving 
consensus. Thus, a willingness to take guidance from democratic theory 
cannot relieve us of the necessity of making hard choices about normative 
ends. Instead, it tends simply to push those choices down a level, converting 
them from choices about the desired qualities of presidential candidates to 
choices among competing conceptions of democratic practice. 
B. Prescriptive Vagueness 
Even if societal agreement on a theory of democracy is feasible, theories of 
democracy often have surprisingly little to say about how best to operationalize 
their own normative commitments. This is in part a consequence of the 
historic focus of democratic theory since the Enlightenment: the legitimacy 
of governmental authority. The great problem to which the Enlightenment 
political project addressed itself was undermining divine providence as the 
basis of governmental—which is to say, monarchical—authority, and refound-
ing it on popular consent. As a result, democratic theories are typically, at 
bottom, theories of popular sovereignty in which the principal concern is 
whether the power exercised by rulers is legitimate, in the sense of authorized 
by popular consent. 
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Because of this focus, democratic theory often has little to say about how 
principles of popular sovereignty are operationalized. Consistent with the idea 
that the will of the popular sovereign must be formed freely, theories of 
democracy tend to assume a wide range of acceptable structural choices, 
and a correspondingly wide range of discretion among polities to choose 
a form of operationalization that best suits their goals and habits. No theory 
of democracy, for example, is so fine-grained at the operational level as either 
to prescribe or to prohibit very substantial yet commonplace variations in the 
format of democratic self-rule such as parliamentary or presidential systems, 
first-past-the-post or proportional electoral methods, short or long terms of 
office, closed or open party lists, and so forth; all such mechanisms are capable 
of satisfying the main requirement of democratic legitimacy. Insofar as demo-
cratic theory is concerned, the key criterion is thus popular sovereignty, not 
any particular instantiation of it. 
A second reason why democratic theories typically offer little guidance at the 
operational level, particularly as relevant to the structure of candidate nominating 
systems, is their historic inattention to the role of political parties. More than 70 
years ago, the great twentieth-century political scientist Elmer Schattschneider 
called parties “the orphans of political philosophy,”43 and his description remains 
apt: “the current literatures on political parties and normative democratic theory 
continue to develop to an extraordinary degree in mutual isolation . . . . [M]odern  
democratic theory is noticeably silent on the question whether political parties 
have a legitimate place and function in a democracy.”44 
Indeed, political parties pose a singular challenge to democratic theory. 
Parties function as intermediate institutions which, though perhaps pragma-
tically necessary,45 stand between the people and their elected representatives, 
thereby complicating the fulfillment of the principal condition of democratic 
legitimacy—that rulers must rule subject to some democratically meaningful 
form of popular consent. Over time, parties have come to exercise an impor-
tant function in democratic practice by organizing an otherwise chaotic public 
sphere, filled with differing political views, into an intellectually coherent 
environment of ideologically competing partisan positions.46 The party, in 
43 E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 10 (1942). 
44 Ingrid van Biezen & Michael Saward, Democratic Theorists and Party Scholars: Why They 
Don’t Talk to Each Other, and Why They Should, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 21, 22 (2008). 
45 Schattschneider famously went so far as to declare that “the political parties created democ-
racy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties.” 
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 43, at  1. 
46 Theorists as disparate as Downs and Rosenblum agree on this point. See DOWNS, supra note 
40, at  25–26; NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE  SIDE  OF  THE  ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF 
PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP 353–56 (2008). 
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other words, “coordinates the beliefs and intentions of activists [and] articu-
lates a collective will.”47 
Democratic legitimacy requires that the popular will dictate the choice of 
rulers. Parties, however, by definition comprise only a portion of the electo-
rate. If parties “assist” the electorate in formulating its will by defining the 
universe of options before the popular will is authoritatively formed, then it is 
not entirely clear that an expression of the popular will formed after parties 
have done their work is democratically equivalent to the formation of such 
a will in the absence of party intermediation. To put the matter differently, the 
role of parties in actively constructing the democratic will lays bare the hard 
truth, not always acknowledged by democratic theorists, that a democratic will 
is not an antecedently existing object to be discovered through the application 
of electoral procedures, but is rather an artifact of those procedures—such 
a will, in other words, is in large part constructed by the very procedures used 
to determine it.48 
C. Infeasibility of Selecting on the Necessary Criteria 
Finally, even where democratic theory is capable of producing concrete 
institutional prescriptions, it is often far from clear that nominating institutions 
can be designed to select candidates on the criteria demanded by the theory. 
Suppose, for instance, that Americans were to choose on normative grounds to 
accept guidance in their practice of democracy from some kind of theory of 
deliberative democracy. The ideal president, in that case, would presumably 
need to be not only a skilled, patient, and respectful deliberator him- or herself, 
but also someone capable of facilitating and leading normatively desirable 
deliberation among different groups, including cabinet officials, members of 
Congress, interest groups, and the general public. 
Fair enough, but how might a nominating system be designed to select 
candidates on these qualities? One way, as we have seen, is to place a thumb 
on the scale by careful construction of the selectorate. Given the commit-
ments of deliberative theories of democracy, an appropriate selectorate might 
thus be comprised of individuals who (1) value the skills of a good deliberative 
leader and (2) will be more responsive to appeals from potential candidates 
47 JONATHAN  WHITE & LEA YPI, THE  MEANING OF PARTISANSHIP  85 (2016). In some societies 
this role has been formally acknowledged: the German Basic Law, for example, provides that 
parties “participate in the formation of the political will of the people.” Const. of Germany, 
art. 22(1). To similar effect, see CONST. OF SWITZERLAND, art. 137; CONST. OF  SPAIN, art. 6. 
48 S. I. BENN & R. S. PETERS, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT  397–99 (1959). 
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who display those qualities than to appeals from candidates with other kinds of 
skills and virtues. 
So far, so good. But of whom, then, would the selectorate actually be 
comprised? How do we identify individuals qualified to serve? Would they 
require specific kinds of experience or training? Certainly, the selectorate 
would likely have to be a small and exclusive group; the general public is 
not known for its great love and respect for genuinely deliberative politics,49 
particularly in the current era of partisan polarization. Similar problems arise 
under any of the various theories of democracy now in circulation. Suppose 
a collective commitment to a theory of protective democracy. To which rights 
and liberties would a qualified candidate have to be committed, and who 
decides? How would qualified members of a selectorate be identified, and by 
whom? 
The problem quickly begins to swallow its own tail. Some theories of 
democracy, most notably democratic minimalism and associated aggregative 
theories, neither expect nor demand broad public participation during the 
nomination phase; such theories are satisfied by mass popular choice among 
whatever set of options may happen to be presented to a passive electorate.50 
Other theories, especially developmental and deliberative ones, often express 
a robust preference for wider public involvement at every stage of the process.51 
Thus, the theories that in principle require the greatest public participation at 
the nominating phase require in practice the most specific and exclusive 
selectorates, whereas the theories most readily amenable to practical imple-
mentation impose no particular requirements on nominating procedures. 
Given the challenges associated with taking useful, concrete guidance from 
democratic theory in the design of nominating procedures, I turn to two other 
possible methods for guiding presidential nominations along desirable path-
ways: threshold qualifications and citizen ethos. 
49 ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE & JOHN  R. HIBBING, STEALTH DEMOCRACY  (2002); 
JAMES A. GARDNER, WHAT  ARE CAMPAIGNS FOR? THE ROLE OF PERSUASION IN 
ELECTORAL LAW AND POLITICS (2009). 
50 SCHUMPETER, supra note 39, at  260; SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 43, at  53–64; DOWNS, 
supra note 40, at  36–38, 220–37; Thomas E. Mann, Is This Any Way to Pick a President? 
Lessons from 2008, in REFORMING THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS, supra note 24, 
at 168. 
51 E.g., Fabio Wolkenstein, A Deliberative Model of Intra-Party Democracy, 24 J. POL. PHIL. 297 
(2016); MIGUEL  PÉREZ-MONEO, LA SELECCIÓN DE CANDIDATOS ELECTORALES EN LOS 
PARTIDOS (2012); Susan E. Scarrow et al., From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: 
The Changing Distribution of Power within Political Parties, in PARTIES WITHOUT PARTISANS: 
POLITICAL CHANGE  IN  ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES 130 (Russell J. Dalton & 
Martin P. Wattenberg eds., 2000). 
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IV. OTHER MECHANISMS OF PATH DEPENDENCY 
A. Candidate Qualifications 
Another common feature of institutional design capable of influencing the 
qualities of candidates for office is the use of constitutional qualifications and 
disqualifications. These mechanisms represent a classic form of constitutional 
self-restraint; they prevent the polity from doing something it might regret—in 
this case, electing an unqualified individual. At the federal level, the U.S. 
Constitution establishes qualifications of age, citizenship, and residency.52 
State constitutions typically establish the same three qualifications for gover-
nor, though some add the requirement that governors be qualified voters,53 
a provision that subjects candidates for executive office to standard grounds of 
disqualification applicable to voters, such as disqualification for mental 
incompetence or felony conviction. In some states, term limit provisions add 
an additional disqualification for having served some prior period in elected 
office.54 The earliest state constitutions often contained property qualifications 
as well, but those provisions were gradually relaxed during the Jacksonian era, 
and are in any case of dubious constitutionality.55 
These kinds of threshold screening requirements, however, do not in 
themselves identify qualities that officeholders must possess in order to be 
able to perform the job competently; there is no intrinsic reason why 
a foreign-born  34-year-old cannot be as good a president as a native-born 36-
year-old. Rather, threshold screening requirements serve as proxies for 
other qualities on which the polity does place considerable weight—experi-
ence and maturity of judgment in the case of age; loyalty to the United 
States in the case of citizenship; knowledge of local needs and interests in 
the case of residency; and responsiveness to the electorate in the case of 
term limits. 
The utility of qualification provisions, however, seems debatable. First, as 
with nominating procedures, the most desirable kinds of screening from the 
point of view of democratic theory pose serious difficulties of implementation. 
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (Representatives); art. I, §3, cl. 3 (Senators); art. II, § 1, cl. 5 
(President). 
53 E.g., CAL. CONST., art. IV, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 5. 
54 E.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
55 See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) and Chappelle v. Greater Baton Rouge Airport 
District, 431 U.S. 159 (1977), summarily reversing 329 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 1976) (both reversing 
state property qualifications for non-elective offices); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating state property requirement for voting eligibility in the form of 
a poll tax). 
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It is no easier to design a threshold qualification to screen for commitment to 
individual liberty or aggregative or deliberative prowess than it is to design 
a nominating procedure to produce the same effect. 
Second, threshold qualification provisions demonstrate a rather low regard 
for voter discernment and self-restraint; they presume that voters are suffi-
ciently likely to be tempted by unqualified candidates to require that the 
electorate as a whole be affirmatively disabled from acting on those tempta-
tions. Even if that presumption is accurate, however, threshold qualifications 
do nothing to prevent voters from deploying this bad judgment by choosing 
inexperienced, immature, disloyal, ignorant, or corrupt candidates who clear 
the constitutional minima. Perhaps the most that might be said for qualifica-
tion provisions is that they prevent voters from electing the most egregiously 
unqualified candidates, but even that assumption seems dubious: incompe-
tence seems to be generously distributed in the population, even among 
native-born, lifelong residents over 35 years of age. If identifying a pool of 
solid, highly competent candidates is the goal, threshold qualifications per-
form only minimally useful work. 
B. Citizen Ethos 
To name citizen ethos as a procedure for screening presidential candidates is 
in a sense merely to name the condition of having no screening process at all, 
or at least no formal one. But the absence of a formal process for screening 
candidates does not mean that no screening criteria exist; it means only that 
citizens will base their choices among candidates on internalized, politically 
consensual criteria, if any exist; or in the absence of consensus, that citizens 
will apply their own personal views of good leadership. Thus, although formal 
screening and nominating procedures can influence the nature of the ulti-
mate choice, they are not the only source of influence; citizens, as social 
beings living in a political community, will also respond to prevailing norms of 
politics. These norms, moreover, will not necessarily be dictated by demo-
cratic theory or by some other, presumptively authoritative source of formal 
principles of governance. Prevailing norms of political choice are just as likely 
to have their source in convention or in pragmatic considerations. Perhaps the 
leading example is the pre-Franklin D. Roosevelt norm of a two-term limit as 
a check on the private ambition of presidential candidates. The strength of this 
norm served for more than a century to screen out of the candidate pool 
individuals who had already served two terms as president, not because formal 
term limits had been imposed by law, but because the prevailing citizen ethos 
deterred voters from voting for any candidate who had the effrontery to run for 
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a third term. During the period when the two-term norm prevailed, such 
candidates would have appeared to the electorate to be guilty of an overween-
ing ambition inconsistent with successful continued service. 
Because informal political norms supply the foundations of citizen decision-
making in electoral politics, they are potentially the most important force for 
guiding the nomination of presidential candidates: only individuals whose 
qualifications comport with these norms will be plausible candidates for elec-
tion. The great difficulty with relying on such norms, however, is that they are 
not easily controlled, or even influenced, by law. On the contrary, originating in 
what Habermas called the “‘wild’ complex” and “anarchic structure” of civil 
society,56 they are vulnerable to social and political movements generated 
within civil society largely outside of the formal control of law. Indeed, many 
now argue that the main problem with politics in the United States—and, 
increasingly, throughout the world—is the deterioration in civil society of long-
standing, previously stable norms of democratic citizenship.57 
This does not mean that citizen ethos cannot be influenced by adjust-
ments to legal and political institutions—the two undoubtedly shape one 
another in a dialectic process, so that institutional processes are in principle 
capable of inducing a kind of civic training. Aristotle, for example, argued 
that the kind of rotation in office typical of Athenian democracy helped to 
produce good rulers because the experience of being ruled taught citizens 
valuable lessons about how to rule well, lessons that they could apply when 
they later held office.58 Much more recently, advocates of instant runoff 
voting argue persuasively that something as simple as allowing voters to 
indicate second and third choices on the ballot has altered the norms of 
political campaigning. When candidates stand to benefit by campaigning for 
voters’ lower-ranked votes, they apparently no longer find it in their interest 
to campaign negatively by smearing and belittling opponents whom some 
voters might rank higher. This change in institutional incentives has thus 
produced more harmonious electoral campaigns in which candidates stress 
their positive attributes rather than their opponents’ negatives so as to avoid  
alienating a slice of potential support.59 Such a change in candidate behavior 
56 HABERMAS, supra note 41, at  307. 
57 See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018); 
Jamal Greene, Trump as a Constitutional Failure, 93 IND. L.J. 93 (2018); Symposium, Is 
Democracy in Decline?, 26 J. DEMOC. 5 ff. (2015). 
58 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. III, ch. iv, § 14–15, 1277b. 
59 See, e.g., Jessie Van Berkel, Ranked-choice Voting Alters Calculus in Minneapolis, St. Paul 
Races, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, Oct. 7, 2017; FairVote, Campaign Civility, 
www.fairvote.org/research_rcvcampaigncivility (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). 
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might in turn generate more positive and less alienated sentiments among 
the electorate toward candidates and politicians. In this way, then, well-
designed institutional structures can help “train” citizens to think and 
behave in desirable ways. 
However, the most common form of pressure on citizen ethos and informal 
norms, at least in today’s environment of cheap, easy communication, is 
ideological. At the moment, tremendous efforts are being made by commu-
nicative means, financed by enormous private fortunes, to alter prevailing 
social attitudes on a host of issues. Citizen ethos is now precisely the site of 
a titanic partisan battle, and for good reason. In addition, the arrival in power of 
the Trump Administration may well be providing a strong form of civic 
training: by normalizing behavior that conflicts radically with previously 
prevailing civic and democratic norms, the administration may well succeed 
in demolishing those norms and replacing them with others more congenial to 
non-democratic practices. Citizen ethos thus may well be by far the most 
significant battleground, quite possibly the only one that really matters. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Complaints about the low quality of presidential candidates are hardly new. 
One of the most astute nineteenth-century observers of American political 
institutions, Lord James Bryce, devoted a chapter of his 1893 book to the 
subject “Why Great Men Are Not Chosen President.” In Bryce’s view, all 
American presidents since Jackson, with the exception of Lincoln and Grant, 
had been “intellectual pigmies beside the real leaders of [their] generation.”60 
Today, however, the stakes are much higher; unlike in Bryce’s time, the 
United States is no longer merely one relatively advanced nation among 
many, but the richest and most powerful nation the world has ever known. 
The quality of its leadership is of concern not only to Americans, but to 
everyone on the planet. 
The historical record shows that the procedures used for nominating pre-
sidential candidates have undergone significant change since the founding, 
and presumably could change again. The logic of institutional analysis shows 
that the design of nominating systems can influence strongly the qualities of 
candidates who successfully clear its screening procedures. Institutional logic 
also suggests that the current trend in nominations of expanding the selecto-
rate to the point where it converges with the electorate tends to nullify the 
capacity of the nomination process to channel the choice of nominees along 
60 JAMES BRYCE, 1  THE  AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 84 (1893). 
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any particular axis of decision, no matter how desirable. Instead, convergence 
of the selectorate and electorate tends to result in a kind of functional delega-
tion of the criteria of choice to self-appointed individuals, groups, and candi-
dates, who may not fully share the collective norms of democratic practice that 
in the end comprise the most significant and effective constraint on the 
behavior of participants in the nominating process. 
At the end of the day, reform of nomination mechanisms may not be the 
most effective site in which to invest reform energy. What we may need more 
than institutional reform is a systematic effort to renew, justify, and strengthen 
democratic norms, an effort that by definition must take place not in the halls 
of legislatures or party bureaucracies, but deep in the terrain of civil society. 
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